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NOTE
The Right to Contract: Use of
Domestic Partnership as a Strategic




Many legal scholars writing about same-sex
marriage in recent years draw an analogy to
constitutional analysis of historical bans on in-
terracial marriage, arguing that prohibitions of
same-sex marriage violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in the
same manner, because such prohibitions classify
on the basis of sex, and thus violate heightened
scrutiny. There is another lesson, however, to
be drawn from the history of constitutional pro-
tection of interracial marriage. Shortly after the
Civil War, a series of cases unsuccessfully ar-
gued that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 gave
black Americans the right to make contracts,
including a marriage contract, with whomever
they chose. While the cases were almost uni-
formly unsuccessful then, narrowing the focus
today to domestic partnerships and other non-
marriage, but legally recognized, relationships
gives the argument renewed vigor. By focusing
on the contractual elements of such relation-
ships-the contractual components of marriage,
but without the social, religious, and political
freight of the institution-such an argument
gives even rational basis review potential value,
and offers a compelling strategy for future liti-
gation.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are few topics as contentious in the
current political atmosphere as gay marriage.
The topic inflames the political arena to the ex-
tent that commentators have speculated that
the controversy aroused by gay marriage al-
lowed Republicans to harness the backlash of
angry conservative voters turning out to the
polls to support state measures banning same-
sex marriage in service of every other Republi-
can candidate and issue on the ballot.'
Unusually, political arguments about same-
sex marriage and constitutional arguments
about the same topic have substantial similari-
ties. Both sides agree that marriage is a funda-
mental right guaranteed by substantive due pro-
cess of the Fourteenth Amendment.a The
disagreement is over the definition of marriage:
whether it is an intrinsically heterosexual insti-
*Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2008. M.Phil., University
of Cambridge, 2005. B.A., University of Southern California,
2003. The author wishes to thank Jeffrey Watts, Professor
Heather Gerken, Professor Jed Rubenfeld, and as always,
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1. See Gregory B. Lewis, Same-Sex Marriage and the 2004
Presidential Election, 38 POLITICAL SCI. & POLITICS 195
(2005).
2. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex
Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1504-05 (1993).
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tution and whether denial of it to same-sex
couples is thus a violation of equal protection of
the laws.'
A previous and similarly contentious dis-
pute over marriage rights occurred over
prohibitions of interracial marriage. While
prohibitions of interracial marriage were struck
down in 1967 in Loving v. Virginia, the first
wave of litigation challenging such prohibitions
was grounded in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
and its grant of an equal right to make and en-
force contracts, rather than in the yet undeter-
mined status of marriage as a fundamental
right.4
While this first wave of litigation was un-
successful, the focus on the contractual nature
of the marriage relationship suggests a new and
intermediate step in the modern debate about
same-sex marriage. The contractual arguments,
such as those advanced in the nineteenth cen-
tury, apply with renewed vigor not to marriage,
but to domestic partnerships that grant the con-
tractual benefits of marriage without the at-
tendant characteristics of what makes marriage
so fundamental.5 Thus, a contractual argument
can be advanced to argue that prohibitions of
same-sex marriage that also prohibit domestic
partnerships or recognition of any contractual
arrangements between same-sex couples are
unconstitutional even under more lenient con-
stitutional scrutiny.
Arguments for same-sex marriage ground-
ed in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause are almost always unsuccessful
because a classification based on sexual orienta-
tion does not result in heightened scrutiny. This
is why many lawyers have argued that describ-
ing same-sex marriage bans as classifications on
3. Id. at 1425
4. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Civil Rights Act of
1866, ch. 31, 14 stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1981).
5. See JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CON-
TRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN
TRADITION 202-09 (1997).
6. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Anal-
ogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145,
149 (1988) [hereinafter The Miscegenation Analogy]; Andrew
Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay
Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 204-05
(1994) (citing Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) for its
application of strict scrutiny on sexual discrimination and for
recognizing gay marriage); Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality
and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 11 (1994) (discussing Jus-
tice Burger's concurrence in Bowers v. Hardwick, 408 U.S.
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the basis of gender is a stronger argument, as
gender-based classifications trigger intermedi-
ate scrutiny.6 However, by combining an equal
protection argument with a contractual focus,
and focusing on domestic partnerships rather
than marriage outright, rational basis review be-
comes a much more successful test.
7
Part II of this note discusses the unsuccess-
ful attempts to assert a right to enter into inter-
racial marriage based upon the right to contract
expressed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Part
III traces the acceptance of marriage as a fun-
damental legal right. Part VI reviews the
changes that have resulted in an increasingly
contractual understanding of modern matri-
mony. Finally, Part V analyzes how a revital-
ized contract-based argument has renewed
prospects in the service of same-sex partner-
ship.
II. THE CONTRACTUAL ARGUMENT
From the beginning of American history,
interracial marriage presented complex legal as
well as social and political, problems. Sexual
relationships between white men and black fe-
male slaves were relatively common and tacitly
accepted, if not condoned, by a slave-owning
society.8 Yet such interactions were viewed as
part of the white man's ownership of the black
slave, not as two individuals choosing to enter
into a romantic and sexual partnership.9 Inter-
racial relationships in which the white partner
wished he and his black partner were accepted
by society as a licit coupling, as opposed to soci-
ety accepting the couple's clandestine sexual in-
teractions with willful semi-ignorance, were
197 (1986), that suggests homosexual sex was more offensive
than rape).
7. See id.
8. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 163-65
(1975); Karen A. Getman, Note, Sexual Control in the Slave-
holding South: The Implementation and Maintenance of a Ra-
cial Caste System, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115, 142 (1984)
(discussing the legal system's silence towards abusive sexual
relationships between white males and black female slaves).
9. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff,
Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and
Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 2000 (1989) ("[in the
case of sexual relations between whites and their slaves, fail-
ure to punish the slave might have been a recognition that
the slave had little choice in preventing the relationship, es-
pecially if the white were the owner").
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viewed as severe transgressions." Even in
states with laws against interracial fornication,
for example, the laws were selectively enforced,
primarily against couples whose relationships
were displayed publicly.1"
As long as slavery was dogmatically estab-
lished in a majority of the United States, there
was little danger that the social norm of intoler-
ance of interracial partnerships would change.
Such an "exceptional relationship... could not
realistically challenge the ruling public order of
racial slavery., 12 But as the abolitionist move-
ment grew, so-called "antimiscegenation"
' 13
statutes prohibiting interracial marriages grew
both in number and severity.14 By 1860,
twenty-three (of thirty-three total) states or ter-
ritories instituted bans on interracial marriage
or fornication, and from 1861-65, seven more
states passed bans on interracial marriage. 5
Overall, six southern states wrote bans of inter-
racial marriage into their state Constitutions
passed after the Civil War.
16
A. The Contractual Argument and Its Few
Victories
Following the Civil War, the re-United
States had to deal with the status of former
slaves, and place them into the legal order of
citizens for the first time. One of the major leg-
islative attempts to spell out the new legal rights
of former slaves was the Civil Rights Act of
1866, a statute so controversial that it had to be
passed twice after President Andrew Johnson
vetoed it.'7 Intended as a tool to implement the
Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slav-
ery, and in response to the emerging Black
Codes in the South, 8 part of the Act stated that
every person born in the United States had
the same right, in every State and Ter-
ritory of the United States, to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be par-
ties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property, and to full
and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens, and shall be subject to like pun-
ishment, pains, and penalties, and to
none other, any law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, or custom, to the
contrary notwithstanding. 9
Emboldened by the stated right to "make
and enforce contracts," a number of suits were
brought challenging statutes prohibiting interra-
cial marriage on the grounds that marriage
should be treated as any other contract, which
African-Americans had the right to enter,
whether it was with a spouse of their own or a
different race.2 °
The vast majority of such attempts failed.
Two cases temporarily succeeded among those
cases asserting a conception of marriage as a
purely civil contract, and were therefore subject
to the rights spelled out in the 1866 Civil Rights
Act.
10. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF
MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 44 (2000).
11. See id. There was also a gendered aspect of such pros-
ecutions: for example, between 1840 and 1860 in rural North
Carolina, thirteen of seventeen prosecutions of interracial
fornication were of couples in which the man was black. Id.
The four exceptions were couples in which the white man
presented his black partner to society as deserving of the
same respect owed a white woman. Id.
12. Id. at 45.
13. See Emily Field Van Tassel, "Only the Law Would Rule
Between Us": Antimiscegenation, the Moral Economy of De-
pendency, and the Debate Over Rights After the Civil War, 70
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 873, 898-99 (1995). Blending miscere, for
"blend," and genus, for "race," the term "miscegenation" was
created for a pamphlet purportedly advocating interracial
marriage and procreation created by two journalists for the
New York World. Id. After showing the pamphlet to promi-
nent Republican politicians as a ruse in order to obtain
favorable comments on the pamphlet's ideas from the politi-
cians, the journalists forwarded the Republicans' statements
to Democrat Samuel Sullivan Cox, who then argued that
Democrats would protect American voters from such outra-
geous ideas. Id.
14. See DAVID H. FOWLER, NORTHERN ATTITUDES To-
WARDS INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE 143-47 (1987) ("From 1831
to 1865 the most portentous development in state legislative
action on interracial marriage was the outbreak for the first
time of substantial public controversy on the topic.").
15. CoTT, supra note 10, at 40.
16. Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, in INTER-
RACIALISM: BLACK-WHITE INTERMARRIAGE IN AMERICAN
HISTORY, LITERATURE AND LAW 65 (Werner Sollors ed.,
2000).
17. PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE MY
WIFE: RACE, MARRIAGE, AND LAw-AN AMERICAN HIS-
TORY 59 (2002). President Johnson specifically expressed
concern that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, while not establish-
ing the right to intermarry, indicated that Congress had the
power to overrule all state laws prohibiting interracial mar-
riage. Id.
18. See id. at 60.
19. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 stat. 27 (codified at
42 U.S.C. 1981).
20. CoTT, supra note 10, at 101.
1. Alabama
Under section 3602 of the Alabama Code
of 1867, an interracial couple that lived to-
gether-married or not-was to be sentenced
to between two and seven years in prison.21
Shortly after the statute went into effect, a
black man named Thornton Ellis and a white
woman named Susan Bishop who lived together
were convicted of violating section 3602, but
were sentenced only to a fine, as though they
had been convicted of the lesser offense of
cohabitating as an unmarried same-race
couple. 22 Ellis and Bishop appealed their con-
victions, however, and the Alabama Supreme
Court noted that the strangely mild punishment
was likely due to the lower court's belief that
the state law violated the Civil Rights Act of
1866.23 The court declared that this interpreta-
tion was mistaken, as the Civil Rights Act did
not "prohibit the making of race and color a
constituent of an offense, provided it does not
lead to a discrimination in punishment., 24 In
keeping with this understanding, the court not
only affirmed the convictions of Ellis and
Bishop, but remanded the case in order that the
harsher prison sentence be imposed in lieu of
the fines to which the pair were previously sen-
tenced.
Shortly after Ellis was decided, elections
for the Alabama Supreme Court were held.26
The elections led to a Republican dominated
Supreme Court, and it was this court that heard
Burns v. State, decided in 1872.27 The case was
named after James Burns, a justice of the peace
who was convicted of officiating at a marriage
of an interracial couple.28 The newly Republi-
can-controlled Alabama Supreme Court hear-
ing his appeal directly reversed course and
overturned Ellis.29
The court's reasoning in Burns flatly con-
tradicted the previous holding that there was
"no conflict" between the prohibition of inter-
racial marriage and the Civil Rights Act of
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1866.30 This time, the Burns court focused on
marriage as a contract that the Civil Rights
Act guaranteed former slaves the right to
form.3 In fact, the court described marriage as
purely a contractual relationship, stating that
"[m]arriage is a civil contract, and in that char-
acter alone is dealt with by the municipal
law.",32 As such, the Civil Rights Act estab-
lished the right of freed blacks "to make and
enforce contracts, amongst which is that of mar-
riage .. .
The understanding of marriage as a con-
tractual right guaranteed by federal law did not
last long. Political response was swift and deci-
sive, reaffirming that interracial marriage was a
crime in Alabama in section 4189 of the Ala-
bama Code of 1876."4 The 1874 election re-
sulted in three Democrats replacing the three
Republicans sitting on the Alabama Supreme
Court.
35
By 1877, the reversal was complete. That
year, the Alabama Supreme Court decided
Green v. State, affirming the conviction of an in-
terracial couple convicted of violating section
4189 of the Alabama Code of 1876 by holding a
marriage ceremony in July of 1876.36 The
court's opinion became a testament against the
contractual nature of marriage cited frequently
by later courts. The subject was addressed di-
rectly:
[i]s marriage, as the argument ob-
jected to assumes, nothing more than a
civil contract? Is it, "in that character
alone," dealt with by the municipal
law? Doubtless, it is by a contract-
that is, by the agreement of the par-
ties-that they enter into the state of
marriage. But, as was said by the Su-
preme Court of Delaware, it is a con-
tract "of a peculiar character and sub-
ject to peculiar principles.,
37
The court proceeded to then cite a number
of authorities supporting its overall contention
that marriage was "'the most interesting and
21. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 17, at 71-72.
22. Id. at 72.
23. Id. at 72-73.
24. Ellis v. State, 42 Ala. 525, 526 (1868).
25. Id. at 527.
26. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 17, at 73.
27. Id.
28. Id.; Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872);





WALLENSTEIN, supra note 17, at 75.
Id. at 71.
Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877)
Id. at 193.
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important'" institution of society, finishing, and
"[w]ho can estimate the evil of introducing into
their most intimate relations, elements so heter-
ogeneous that they must naturally cause dis-
cord, shame, disruption of family circles and es-
trangement of kindred?"3 With the implicit
reversal of Ellis,3 9 statutes prohibiting interra-
cial marriage would remain undisturbed among
Alabama's laws for decades.4"
2. Louisiana
The second case which held that marriage
was a civil contract and thus subject to the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was not a direct challenge to
a prohibition of interracial marriage; rather, it
arose from a dispute over inheritances. 4' E.C.
Hart lived with and fathered children by Corne-
lia Hart, a black woman.42 In 1867, E.C. and
Cornelia were married in Shreveport, and E.C.
Hart died eighteen months later.4 3 Both Corne-
lia, as widow and mother to his children, and
Theodore Hart, representing several white rela-
tives, claimed a right to inherit E.C. Hart's es-
tate."
The question of inheritance turned on
whether the marriage between E.C. and Corne-
lia was legal.45 If it was a marriage recognized
by the state of Louisiana, then Cornelia was
clearly the next of kin and entitled to the es-
tate.46 At the time of the ceremony between
E.C. and Cornelia, however, Louisiana state
law prohibited interracial marriage, which
would have denied Cornelia rights as widow
and her children rights as illegitimate heirs.47
Her attorneys argued that the Civil Rights Act
invalidated the Louisiana law, while the repre-
sentatives of Theodore Hart argued that the
Louisiana state law was effectual and thus the
"pretended marriage" between "a white person
and a person of color" was "null as having been
entered into in violation of a prohibitory law.",
48
Cornelia's attorneys also argued that the Four-
teenth Amendment trumped the Louisiana pro-
hibition, but the Amendment was ratified in
1868, after the challenged marriage took
place. 49 Thus, who inherited E.C. Hart's estate
turned on whether the Civil Rights Act invali-
dated the Louisiana state law.
The Louisiana State Supreme Court held
that it did.5 ° Judge Taliferro's opinion for the
court first held, finding against Theodore Hart's
argument, that there was "no reason to doubt
the constitutionality" of the Civil Rights Act.5'
The court then found that in Louisiana, "[o]ur
law considers marriage in no other view than as
a civil contract., 52 The opinion then established
the right of E.C. and Cornelia's children to in-
herit his estate, as their parents had married af-
ter their birth and E.C. had taken numerous
public steps to recognize them as his children.
As in the case of Alabama, the decision in-
terpreting marriage as a civil contract regulated
by the Civil Rights Act was issued by a court
dominated by Republicans.53 In Louisiana,
however, the domination was more tenuous -
the Hart decision was a slim majority of 3 to 2.
And while the decision took longer to overturn
than in Alabama, the Louisiana legislature did
pass a renewed prohibition of interracial mar-
riage in 1894 that was not successfully chal-
lenged in court.
B. Why the Contractual Argument Failed
The two examples of successful challenges
to prohibitions of interracial marriage were de-
termined by a court willing to regard marriage,
or at least governmental regulation of marriage,
as purely contractual. In contrast, the vastly
greater number of examples in which challenges
to interracial marriage bans based in the Civil
Rights Act56 were unsuccessful focused on the
Id. at 194.
See id. at 197.
WALLENSTEIN, supra note 17, at 79.




See id. at 91-92.






52. Hart, 26 La. Ann. at 94.
53. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 17, at 86.
54. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 17, at 86.
55. Corr, supra note 10, at 101, n.72.
56. See, e.g., Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 192 (1877) ("[t]he
argument in support of this decision was as follows: ' ....
[t]he civil rights bill now confers.., marriage with any citizen
capable of entering into that relation'"); In re Hobbs, 12 F.
Cas. 262, 262-63 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871) ("The primary, but not
the only question presented by the relators for consideration
is, whether [the interracial marriage ban] is repugnant to the
fourteenth amendment and the civil rights bill .... "); State v.
elements of marriage above and beyond mere
contract: religious, societal, and public institu-
tions.
1. Contracts as Concerning Property
Over a dozen suits making claims to the
right to contract were unsuccessful, virtually all
stressing the importance of marriage to society,
emphasizing that such a fundamental relation-
ship could not be governed as merely a con-
tract.57 Many opinions quoted Dartmouth Col-
lege v. Woodward, in which Chief Justice
Marshall mentioned in dicta that article I, sec-
tion 10 of the Constitution (declaring that "[n]o
State shall" make any "Law impairing the Obli-
gation of Contracts"58 ) was only understood to
apply to contracts "which respect property, or
some object of value .... It never has been un-
derstood to restrict the general right of the leg-
islature to legislate on the subject of di-
vorces. '59 The less that a marriage contract
seemed to deal with the mundane details of as-
sets, community property, and legal rights
against a spouse, therefore, the less likely that
any mention of "contract" in a statute-such as
the 1866 Civil Rights Act-was interpreted as
including marriage.
2. Marriage as a Public Institution
Many spoke of marriage as a public institu-
tion - "more than a civil contract; it is a rela-
tion, an institution.,60 A Georgia case noted
that while many thought of marriage "as a con-
tract in the common meaning of the term," and
acknowledged that "it has, in a limited sense,
properties which assimilate it to an ordinary
contract," marriage was nonetheless "some-
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thing more; it is an institution of public concern-
ment, created and governed by the public will
of the state or nation.' The Supreme Court of
Arkansas also asserted that marriage was not
"only a civil contract," but was "a social and do-
mestic relation, subject to the exercise of the
highest governmental power of the sovereign
state - the police power., 62 In addition, in
Green v. Alabama, the Alabama Supreme
Court approvingly cited a Kentucky case that
held:
[a]s every well organized society is es-
sentially interested in the existence
and harmony and decorum of all its
social relations, marriage, the most el-
ementary and useful of them all, is
regulated and controlled by the sover-
eign power of the State ....
[T]herefore, marriage, being much
more than a contract, and depending
essentially on the sovereign will, is not,
as we presume, embraced by the con-
stitutional interdiction of legislative
acts impairing the obligation of con-
tracts.63
These descriptions of marriage were in line
with, and sometimes cited, a Supreme Court
opinion issued in 1888. The case itself, Maynard
v. Hill,64 did not deal with interracial marriage,
but instead with a question of whether a divorce
granted by the territorial legislature of Oregon
was valid. The language used to explain why
the legislative divorce was valid is very similar
to the descriptions of marriage appearing in
later interracial marriage cases.65 In Maynard,
Justice Field's majority opinion stated that mar-
riage "is an institution, in the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply inter-
Thtty, 41 F. 753, 754 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1890) ("That such law
denies to the petitioners the right secured to them by the
constitution and laws of the United States providing for
equal civil rights of themselves and all other citizens of the
United States to protection against the laws in a state, im-
pairing the obligation of contracts."); State v. Gibson, 36 Ind.
389, 394 (1871) ("But it is urged that the civil rights bill has
abrogated the section of our statute which renders it a felony
for a negro to marry a white woman of this State, or for a
white man to marry a negro woman."); State v. Hairston, 63
N.C. 451, 453 (1869) ("It was insisted that the Civil Rights
Bill has declared a different policy and has changed the
law."); Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287, 306 (1871) ("If the Afri-
can, in this country, has been elevated to a perfect equality in
social, as well as political, rights with the Caucasian; if that
race can claim at all the right to marry and be given in mar-
riage with the sons and daughters of our people, it must be
claimed alone by virtue of the foregoing amendments and the
laws [the Enforcement Act and Civil Rights Act of 1866] en-
acted for their enforcement."); Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App.
263, 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1877) ("It is urged that the Civil
Rights Bill has abrogated the section of our statute under
which the indictment in this cause was found.").
57. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. 518 (1819).
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
59. Trs. of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 624, 629.
60. Hairston, 63 N.C. at 453 (emphasis in original).
61. Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. at 263.
62. Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 60 (1895) (citing Green v.
State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877)).
63. Green, 58 Ala. at 193 (emphasis omitted) (citing
Maguire v. Maguire, 37 Ky. 181 (1838)).
64. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
65. Co-r, supra note 10, at 101, n.72.
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ested, for it is the foundation of the family and
of society, without which there would be
neither civilization nor progress., 66 Marriage is
described as "'more than a contract .... It par-
takes more of the character of an institution
regulated and controlled by public authority,
upon principles of public policy, for the benefit
of the community."' 67
Generally, cases discussing the significance
of marriage as a public institution acknowledge
the contractual elements of marriage, but dis-
miss them as superficial descriptions with no
real force. In these cases, the significance of
marriage is stressed repeatedly as a building
block of society. The idea is thus reminiscent of
religious or civic analogies of marriage as mi-
crocosms of the power relationship between
God and man, or the State and its citizens.
When read as a reproduction of the greater re-
lationship on an individual scale, the signifi-
cance of reversing accepted norms, such as a
white woman married to a black man, is hard to
mistake.
3. Marriage as Religious
Other courts have stressed marriage as a
component of civilization with an intensely
moral dimension and effect upon society. The
Supreme Court of Virginia argued that "[t]he
right to regulate the institution of marriage...
and to impose such restraints upon the relation
as the laws of God, and the laws of propriety,
morality, and social order demand, has been ex-
ercised by all civilized governments in all ages
of the world."6 8 Many courts also focused upon
the religious foundation of marriage, stating
that marriage "is a public institution established
by God himself," and is "God-given, civilizing,
and Christianizing., 69 The Supreme Court of
Tennessee declared that marriage "is an institu-
tion of God, and a very honorable state."7 ° and
continued to make a Biblical argument against
interracial marriage, quoting Genesis to illus-
trate that "[t]he discrimination as to race and
people, in this most important institution, has
been observed, even from the days of the pa-
triarchs."'"
Conceiving of marriage as a religious insti-
tution was doubly effective, because not only
did the argument deny marriage as a purely
contractual relation, but it also reinforced argu-
ments for segregation based on religious
grounds. For example, in Scott v. Georgia, the
State noted that
[b]efore the laws, the Code of Georgia
makes all citizens equal, without re-
gard to race or color. But it does not
create, nor does any law of the State
attempt to enforce, moral or social
equality between the different races or
citizens of the State. Such equality
does not in fact exist, and never can.
The God of nature made it otherwise,
and no human law can produce it, and
no human tribunal can enforce it.7 2
In Lonas v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court
of Tennessee argued that bans of interracial
marriage were "impos[ing] such restraints upon
the relation as the laws of God" require.73 The
court then cited Genesis as an illustration of the
laws of God prohibiting interracial marriage."
C. Interracial Marriage Bans as Status Quo
The language in Maynard is especially ap-
posite to an understanding of marriage as a con-
tract, because the only case which challenged a
prohibition of interracial marriage to reach the
United States Supreme Court did not raise the
contractual argument.75 Pace v. Alabama, de-
cided five years before Maynard, was an ex-
tremely short decision, challenging prohibitions
grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.76 The Court held that
because "[t]he punishment of each offending
person, whether white or black, is the same,"
the law applied equally to both whites and
blacks and thus could not be found to violate
equal protection of the laws.7 7 The law also did
66. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211.
67. Id. at 213 (quoting Wade v. Kalbfleisch, 58 N.Y. 282,
284 (1874)).
68. Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. 858, 862 (1878).
69. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 402-03 (1871).
70. Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287, 308 (1871).
71. Id. at 310.
72. Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 326 (1869).
73. Lonas, 50 Tenn. at 310.
74. Id. (citing Genesis 24:3-4 ("'[t]hou shalt not,' said
Abraham, 'take a wife unto my son of the daughters of the
Canaanites, among whom I dwell; but thou shalt go unto my
country, and to my kindred, and take a wife unto my son
Isaac'")).
75. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
76. Id. at 585 (focusing on equal protection argument).
77. Id.
not speak to the qualities or salient characteris-
tics of marriage at all.78
All challenges to interracial marriage,
whether on contractual grounds or otherwise,
were eventually rejected until the twentieth
century.79 Even the infamous Plessy v. Fergu-
son decision referenced the contract argument
only to dismiss it without analysis, finding that:
"[f]aws forbidding the intermarriage of the two
races, may be said in a technical sense to inter-
fere with the freedom of contract, and yet have
been universally recognized as within the police
power of the State."8
III. HOW MARRIAGE BECAME
FUNDAMENTAL
A. How Racism Helped Codify Marriage as
Fundamental
In some respects, the resistance to interra-
cial marriage and ideation of marriage as a fun-
damental moral component of a civilized soci-
ety was a self-perpetuating cycle. As black
Americans sought to become equal members of
American society, many whites increasingly
tried to codify lines between the races through
prohibitions of interracial marriage.81 As such
laws were challenged, the rhetoric used to de-
fend them increasingly emphasized the funda-
mental importance of marriage, both because
such arguments seemingly refuted contractual
legal arguments for allowing interracial mar-
riage and because championing marriage as a
fundamental right under attack by blacks was
an extremely effective political argument.
Given the still-overwhelmingly racist status
quo, the more fundamental the status of mar-
riage, the more of a threat to social order inter-
racial marriage presented, and the more force
describing the peril of interracial marriage had
in political debate. Thus, the political currency
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helped develop an understanding of the mar-
riage relationship as particularly fundamental
and unique to American society.
In particular, the menace of black men
marrying white women became the rallying cry
of outraged white southerners. For example, in
Bowlin v. Kentucky, the question of who could
give testimony in court became a paean to the
danger of interracial marriages.82 The case was
a challenge to a Kentucky statute that prohib-
ited African-Americans from testifying as wit-
nesses in trials of white people, although one
African-American could testify against another
African-American.83 The Kentucky Court of
Appeals held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866
could not be meant to overrule the Kentucky
statute, because "on this theory ... the unquali-
fied 'same power to make and enforce con-
tracts' attempted to be given by that bill to
black citizens would legalize intermarriages be-
tween the two races deteriorating to the Cauca-
sian blood, and destructive of the social and leg-
islative decorum of States." 4
Interracial marriage became the capstone
of "social equality" between the races, which
opponents of civil rights insisted was not and
could not be mandated by law. In contrast to
civil or political rights, which the Civil Rights
Act and Civil War Amendments did fundamen-
tally affect, social equality was seen as the ref-
uge of private action." Every possible incur-
sion upon the superiority of white America was
characterized by opponents as presenting men
with "the degradation to our manhood" that
mixed-race grandchildren borne to their daugh-
ters would embody.8 6 An admittedly extreme
example of white superiority was the Georgia
constitutional convention delegate who insisted
that not including adequate debt protection for
whites in the 1877 state constitution would
''sooner or later lead" to "the amalgamation of
78. Id.
79. The first successful challenge was Perez v: Sharp, 198
P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
80. 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896) (citing State v. Gilbson, 36
Ind. 389 (1871)).
81. Van Tassel, supra note 13, at 896 ("Antimiscegenation
rules, long a small part of the larger machinery of Southern
slave and caste law (applying as they did to free people as
well as slaves), were revived after the war, given new, inde-
pendent emphasis, and put in service as a symbol of White
resistance to 'social equality' with former slaves.").
82. 65 Ky. 5 (1867).
83. Id. at 6.
84. Id. at 9.
85. See Mark V. Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Con-
stitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois,
and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HIST. 884, 886
(1987) ("[t]he lawmakers who discussed equality during Re-
construction accepted mid-century conceptions that distin-
guished equality with respect to civil rights, to social rights,
and to political rights").
86. Rowland Berthoff, Conventional Mentality: Free
Blacks, Women, and Business Corporations as Unequal Per-
sons, 1820-1870, 76 J. AM. HIST. 753, 772-73 (1989) (quoting
an Irish New Yorker in 1867).
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the races." 87 Whether such fears were genuine
or were voiced as a mere "political smokes-
creen, ' 88 the choice of a white person to marry
a black person was understood as fundamen-
tally upsetting the accepted social order rather
than as a simple matter of contractual relation-
ships.
B. The Modern Understanding of Marriage as
a Legal Right
When prohibitions of interracial marriage
were eventually struck down by the United
States Supreme Court, the justification for the
shift derived in an important sense from the
previous instances in which the Court had ac-
knowledged marriage as a fundamental right.
Beginning in the 1870s, the Supreme Court be-
gan to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee to due process as encompassing "sub-
stantive guarantees."8 9 Initially, the focus of
such substantive rights was upon a liberty to
contract, but in the early twentieth century, the
conception expanded to include sexuality and
marriage. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court
noted that "[w]hile this court has not attempted
to define with exactness the liberty" guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment, "it denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual . . . to marry.
90
Along similar lines, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,
when striking down a policy of sterilizing repeat
criminal offenders, the Court declared, "[w]e
are dealing here with legislation which involves
one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very ex-
istence and survival of the race." 91
In Loving v. Virginia, the 1967 case that
struck down the sixteen remaining state
prohibitions of interracial marriage, the United
States Supreme Court cited Meyer and Skinner
to underscore the fact that Virginia's power to
regulate marriages within the state was still cir-
cumscribed by the commands of the Fourteenth
Amendment.92 The Court concluded that such
prohibitions violated both the Equal Protec-
tion93 and Due Process94 Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Subsequent Supreme
Court cases speaking to marriage rights have
varied in identifying marriage as a fundamental
right rooted in equal protection or due pro-
cess,95 which could potentially be relevant if a
state were to ban marriages entirely. However,
whether the primary identification is with equal
protection or substantive due process, the
courts clearly understood marriage to be much
more than a mere contractual agreement.
C. The Significance of a Fundamental Right
This legal grounding of marriage as solely
within the realm of substantive due process as a
fundamental right was, at minimum, assisted by
the social significance with which interracial
marriage was freighted. Marriage was not
thought of as a purely private contractual agree-
ment in the nineteenth century, but the initial
wave of challenges to prohibitions of interracial
marriage that were grounded in the right to
contract indicate that the contractual element
was recognized even then.96 The social signifi-
cance of allowing whites and blacks to marry,
and the change in social status that such official
relationships would signify, completely over-
whelmed the more technical legal argument de-
87. Van Tassel, supra note 13, at 905 (citations omitted).
88. See Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the
Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REV.
1224, 1253 (1966).
89. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 737, 742 (1989).
90. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
91. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
92. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1, 6-7.
93. Id. at 12 ("There can be no doubt that restricting the
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications vio-
lates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.").
94. Id. ("These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty
without due process of law in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.").
95. Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2081, 2089 (2005). The author stated that:
[v]ery oddly, the Turner Court did not specify whether
the right to marry is rooted in substantive due process
(as Loving suggested) or in the fundamental rights
branch of equal protection doctrine (the most sensible
reading of Zablocki). It would be fair to read the Court
as treating marriage as akin to other privacy rights, in a
way that suggests that substantive due process is in-
volved. But for purposes of reaching its conclusion, the
Court did not have to choose between the two possible
sources of its decision.
Id.
96. Gilbson, 36 Ind. at 402 ("in this State marriage is
treated as a civil contract, but it is more than a mere civil
contract").
void of marriage's status characteristics. Simi-
larly, the controversy surrounding legalization
of same-sex marriage today is due in large part
to the social significance of allowing homosexu-
als to marry. Official recognition of homosex-
ual relationships by the state is interpreted by
both supporters and opponents as a signal that
gay Americans would be accepted in the main-
stream.
For this reason, it seems clear that the legal
battle over allowing same-sex partners to marry
must be argued within the framework of mar-
riage as a fundamental right, grounded in the
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
contractual argument advanced for striking
down prohibitions of interracial marriage failed,
because marriage is understood to be much
more than simply a contract. Thus contractual
arguments for marriage of same-sex partners
will also fail.
Despite this understanding of marriage as a
fundamental right, however, the contractual el-
ements of marriage have become much more
widely accepted and implemented over the last
few decades. In the next section, I discuss how
far marriage has moved towards the realm of
contract rather than fundamental status.
IV. THE INCREASED ACCEPTANCE
AND USE OF THE CONTRACTUAL
ASPECTS OF THE MARRIAGE
RELATIONSHIP
For hundreds of years, the Judeo-Christian
concept of marriage was regarded as an irre-
versible bond.97 Marriage was not an agree-
ment between two people; it was an institution
created by God, regulated by the state, and en-
tirely out of the hands of the two individuals
choosing to join in it.9" As with most of family
law, however, the provision of a "one size fits
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all" state-mandated form of marriage has stead-
ily been eroded in favor of "private norm crea-
tion and private decision making."99
The first move towards a contractual con-
ception of marriage was in the nineteenth cen-
tury, possibly inspiring some of the litigation
challenging prohibitions of interracial marriage.
Seeds of a "contractarian model" of marriage
have been described as the product of the En-
lightenment, 00 the general move to separate
Church from state, and "post-Revolutionary
America's emphasis on individual rights.
' 10 1
An individualized negotiation of the marriage
contract was also promoted by early feminists,
such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, as allowing wo-
men more freedom within a traditionally op-
pressive legal regime.
The twentieth century, however, has seen
these seeds sprout into full flowers. The under-
standing both of marriage itself and of relation-
ships resembling, but not becoming, marriage
has changed drastically, thus contributing to a
modern conception of marriage weighted much
more towards the contractual side.
A. Diminished Role of Religion
One of the most striking changes in the un-
derstanding of marriage is the vastly diminished
role of religion. For many if not most Ameri-
cans, there is still a religious element to mar-
riage, and certainly religious language is in-
voked frequently in discussions of what
marriage is or should be. 102 However, a Chris-
tian defense of marriage cannot be invoked in
the courtrooms of secular, modern America."0 3
The more flexible understanding of marriage
untethered from religious doctrines has been
explicitly recognized as no longer necessarily
prohibiting marriage "between any two part-
ners."
104
97. Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and
Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869, 875 (1994) [hereinafter
Brinig, Marriage].
98. Id.
99. Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992
Wis. L. REV. 1443, 1444, 1446-47 (1992).
100. WITTE, supra note 5, at 196.
101. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:
LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
20 (G. Edward White, ed., The University of North Carolina
Press) (1985).
102. See Should Gay Marriage Be Legal?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, June 3, 1996, at 31-32 ("Marriage as an in-
stitution is already threatened by divorce and by the erosion
of religion and family values. If gay couples were allowed to
marry, it would set a bad example for children and could
spell the downfall of one of the cornerstones of our society").
103. Id. ("Separation of Church and State is a fundamen-
tal democratic principle").
104. Jennie Holman Blake, Book Note, The History and
Evolution of Marriage From Sacrament to Contract: Mar-
riage, Religion, and Law in the Western Tradition, 1999
B.Y.U. L. REV. 847, 857 (1999) (reviewing WITTE, supra note
5); see also WITTE, supra note 5, at 195 ("Today, a contractual
view of marriage has come to dominate American law, lore,
and life-largely unbuffered by complementary spiritual, so-
cial, or natural perspectives, and largely unreceptive to much
of a role for the church, state, or broader community").
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B. Embrace of Additions to the Marriage
Contract
In practical terms, marriage now allows for
a significant degree of individualized negotia-
tion between spouses to create a personalized
version of the marriage agreement. Obviously
the broad parameters of marriage are still set
out by the state, but the flexibility afforded by
contracts and agreements added on top of the
traditional marriage contract is a significant de-
parture from the older concept of marriage as a
single rigid form mandated by religious
precepts.
1. Prenuptial Agreements
One supra-contract added to marriage is a
prenuptial agreement. Until the 1970s, prenup-
tial agreements were rarely accepted or en-
forced, as courts generally held them to be
against public policy, both for promoting or en-
couraging divorce, and simply because prenup-
tial agreements changed the state-dictated
terms of the marriage contract.'0 5 Interestingly,
some articulations as to why individualized
agreements that changed the marriage contract
were unenforceable still used the language of
contractual analysis, holding that added agree-
ments lacked consideration.10 6 The now-univer-
sal acceptance of prenuptial agreements indi-
cates not only the changed attitudes towards
divorce, but also an acceptance of marriage as
allowing for individual customization.
2. Divorce
The toleration of divorce as a normal and
licit occurrence, and the embrace of no-fault di-
vorce, further indicates a move towards a con-
tract-based understanding of marriage. 1°7
Rather than an unbreakable vow, the relatively
easy dissolution of marriage and the legal nego-
tiation of alimony and child support agreements
that often accompany such dissolutions resem-
ble the negotiations surrounding termination of
a generic long-term contract. °8 This contract-
like dissolution has become the target of critics
suggesting that divorce has become too easy,
and that because marriage can be dissolved at
the whim of the partners without fault, blame,
or attendant penalties, marriage vows have be-
come unenforceable.' 0 9
In the limited history of actual legal en-
forcement of the marriage vows, the enforce-
ment was grounded in a contractual under-
standing. One way to understand causes of
action for divorce is as analogous to a breach of
contract - for example, a husband's failure to
support his wife financially was once seen as not
simply a moral failing of his status as provider,
but a failure to fulfill the terms of his marriage
contract. As such, nonsupport was codified in
many states as grounds for the wife to seek di-
vorce.110 Support as a duty applicable only to
husbands is no longer recognized, as the femi-
nist movement has worked to ensure that wo-
men have the right and ability to support them-
selves, but some interpretations of marriage
contracts as legally binding documents continue
to develop. For example, some courts have
viewed components of religious contracts, such
as the Jewish ketubah, as an agreement with le-
gal obligations and consequences.111
C. Expanding Legal Recognition of
Partnerships Beyond the Marriage Vows
The growing entry of contractual analysis
into the marriage relationship has been mir-
rored by an expansion of the relationships and
legal rights of marriage into non-marital rela-
tionships. Benefits and, in some cases, obliga-
tions of marriage have been extended to apply
to unmarried couples and families in a variety
of contexts. Changing societal attitudes regard-
ing premarital sexual activity and childbearing
have had a significant effect on this process, as
marriage is no longer "the only legitimate arena
for intimacy, sex and procreation." '112
105. Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The En-
forcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think
About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 150 (1998).
106. Singer, supra note 99, at 1457.
107. See id. at 1459-60.
108. See Margaret F. Brinig, Book Note, Status, Contract
and Covenant, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1596-97 (1994)
[hereinafter Brinig, Status] (reviewing MILTON C. REGAN,
JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1993)).
109. See Brinig, Marriage, supra note 97, at 871-72, 879;
June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage:
Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform,
65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 958 (1991).
110. Brinig, Status, supra note 108, at 1584.
111. See Jodi M. Solovy, Civil Enforcement of Jewish Mar-
riage and Divorce: Constitutional Accommodation of a Relig-
ious Mandate, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 493, 493 (1996).
112. Singer, supra note 99, at 1453.
1. Nonmarital Partnership Obligations:
Marvin v. Marvin
One of the most telling extensions of mari-
tal obligations to a nonmarital relationship oc-
curred in the case Marvin v. Marvin."
3
Michelle Marvin, formerly Triola, alleged that
she and the actor Lee Marvin had orally agreed
to live together, present themselves to others as
husband and wife, that she would perform
housework in lieu of her previous career, and
that Lee Marvin would financially support her
for the rest of her life-in short, that they
would embody the stereotypical marriage rela-
tionship of breadwinning husband and domestic
housewife without becoming legally married." 4
After several years, the two ended their rela-
tionship and Mr. Marvin refused to support her,
at which point she sued for the same property
division and support rights that she would have
received had they been married. 5
The California Supreme Court explicitly
stated that it would not treat the two exactly as
though they were married, but nevertheless
treated the relationship as possessing legal obli-
gations of some degree.1 16 The court took pains
to emphasize the unique significance of mar-
riage, "point[ing] out that the structure of soci-
ety itself largely depends upon the institution of
marriage,""' 7 but the decision was ground-
breaking for nonmarital partners. The opinion
minimizes the significance of its holding, stating
that "[w]e need not treat nonmarital partners as
putatively married persons ... we need to treat
them only as we do any other unmarried per-
sons.""' 8 This seemingly innocuous statement,
however, was a change from the previous legal
rejection of nonmarital relationships. Agree-
ments based on a consideration of "illicit cohab-
itation" between two unmarried partners of any
kind had been considered void and unenforce-
able due to concerns of public policy." 9 The
sexual relationship between two unmarried per-
sons, that is, meant that courts were unwilling
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to treat them as "any other unmarried per-
sons." 120 The court in Marvin altered the legal
landscape by holding that the relationship and
agreements between nonmarital partners could
be understood as "an implied contract, agree-
ment of partnership or joint venture," "some
other tacit understanding between the parties,"
or could have applied "the doctrine of quantum
meruit, or equitable remedies such as construc-
tive or resulting trusts."'121 The only nod to the
previous non-recognition of unmarried partners
was a note that contracts or agreements that
were "explicitly founded on the consideration
of meretricious sexual services" would not be
enforced by the courts. 122 Not all states have
followed California's example, and the Califor-
nia court did not ultimately grant Michelle Mar-
vin the full benefits she would have been enti-
tled to had she and Lee Marvin been legally
married. 2 3 But Marvin v. Marvin ushered in a
new level of legal recognition of non-marital
partnerships.
124
D. The Limits of Contract
Obviously, marriage still occupies a special
status not only in terms of societal significance,
but also in the eyes of the law.
1. Counterexample: Michael H. v. Gerald
D.
For example, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., a
1989 custody case, the United States Supreme
Court held that a marital relationship could
trump a biological father's claim for visitation
rights.'25 According to California law, a child
born to a married man and woman who are liv-
ing together is presumed to be the child of the
husband unless one of the spouses objects. 26
This was challenged by Michael H., a man who
had engaged in an adulterous affair with his
neighbor Carole D., married to Gerald D.127
Michael and Carole's affair produced a child,
who the two confirmed was Michael's daughter
with a blood test when the child was six months
113. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
114. Id. at 110.
115. Id. at 110-11.
116. Id. at 122.
117. Id.
118. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 121.
119. See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the
Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1803, 1814 (1985).
120. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 121.
121. Id. at 109.
122. Id. at 110.
123. Id. at 122-23 (granting Michelle Marvin limited recov-
ery).
124. See Schneider, supra note 119, at 1814-15.
125. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989).
126. Id. at 117-18.
127. Id. at 113.
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old.128 When Michael and Carole's affair en-
ded, Michael filed suit in California asking for
visitation rights. 129 Despite paternity test re-
suits recognized and acknowledged by the
courts showing that the child was Michael's
daughter, when the case was appealed to the
Supreme Court, a majority of the Justices held
that California's law, which barred the biologi-
cal father of a child from having any visitation
rights with her, was perfectly acceptable. 30 Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion for the Court held that
"our traditions have protected the marital fam-
ily . . .against the sort of claim Michael as-
serts.",
131
2. The Situation Today: Marriage Is No
Longer the Only Option
Marriage has therefore not lost all the spe-
cial legal privileges concomitant with its histori-
cal status. It has, however, lost its monopoly as
the only partnership recognized by the state.
Sexual activity and procreation are now com-
monly accepted and given legal protection
outside of the marriage vows, 132 and the legal
system recognizes limited aspects of non-mari-
tal partnerships.133
V. APPLYING THE CONTRACTUAL
ARGUMENT TO SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS
A. Why Divorce the Contractual Element?
A contract-based argument for the right to
marry will likely fail today just as it failed in the
early cases challenging prohibitions of interra-
cial marriage. Marriage's contractual elements
are recognized, more now than ever in the na-
tion's legal history, but marriage is still con-
ceived of as a "contract plus," an agreement be-
tween two individuals that can be customized to
a limited extent, but with the added freight of
societal expectation, religious significance, and
social history. 134 If a relationship can be cre-
ated, however, that is just the contractual ele-
ments, removing the plus from the equation, a
legal argument rested purely in the right to con-
tract would likely be much more successful.
The possibility of an expansion of legal rights
for nonmarital partnerships thus presents an in-
teresting, if partial, potential solution to the
question of same-sex marriage.
Focusing on the contractual characteristics
of the marriage partnership without the added
social significance that makes marriage a funda-
mental right has obvious flaws as an activist
strategy. Concentrating on domestic partner-
ships rather than marriage per se does not ad-
dress the most contentious elements of the mar-
riage discussion head-on. Same-sex marriage is
an issue of importance for advocates of homo-
sexual rights, that is, because it is inseparable
from related notions of status and societal ac-
ceptance. The very characteristics that suggest
the viability of a contract-based argument for
domestic partnerships, therefore, are for many
the reason why same-sex marriage is important:
more than the practical benefits of domestic
partnerships, the status as societally-recognized,
condoned, and celebrated partnerships is the
true significance of same-sex marriage. To the
extent that such acceptance is the goal of work-
ing towards same-sex marriage, therefore, the
contract-based approach is inadequate.
There are two reasons, however, why
targeting the intermediate step of domestic
partnerships is useful to the ultimate goal of
same-sex marriage.
1. Tangible Benefits
First, and most simply, there are numerous
legal rights attendant to marriage that can also
be achieved through domestic partnership. The
most recent assessment by the United States
General Accounting Office found that there are
a total of 1,138 federal statutory provisions
alone in which marriage is a factor-generally a
determinative one-in eligibility.135 To the ex-
tent that marriage is desirable because of the le-
128. Id. at 113-14.
129. Id. at 131-32.
130. Id. at 124.
131. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124
132. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(holding anti-gay sodomy laws unconstitutional); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the holding in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut to non-married couples).
133. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976)
(holding that agreements between non-marital partners
could be understood as an implied contract).
134. See id.
135. Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Associate General
Counsel, United States General Accounting Office, to Sena-
tor Bill Frist, United States Senate Majority Leader (Jan. 23,
2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.
pdf.
gal rights it confers upon spouses, therefore, do-
mestic partnerships that confer some or all of
the same rights are also desirable.
2. Creating a Spectrum
The second reason why domestic partner-
ships are pragmatically useful is more abstract
and turns upon how society's understanding of
marriage continues to change. One facet of the
evolving understanding of marriage is the ex-
pansion of the legal recognition of partnerships,
such as acknowledging unmarried partners
under the law.136 This expanding recognition
can also include establishing several versions of
a marriage relationship, offering a spectrum of
legal partnership options for couples intending
to formalize their relationship under the law.
There are several possible forms that this
further expansion could take. Some have pro-
posed a move to a pure contract model, in
which the state has no role in licensing or ap-
proving marital relationships apart from the
general law of contracts.137 Such partnerships
would be governed exclusively by private con-
tracts negotiated by the individuals involved.138
Margaret Brinig conceptualizes marriage as a
covenant; an "especially solemn type of con-
tract" that is meant to be of "infinite dura-
tion., 139 Brinig's model includes the possibility
of some individualized negotiation and modifi-
cation to a universal base structure.140 In con-
trast, the "covenant marriages" now available in
Arkansas, Arizona, and Louisiana give engaged
couples the choice to enter into a marriage that
cannot be terminated by a no-fault divorce. 41
And a handful of states have made domestic
partnerships available to same-sex partners. 142
William Eskridge, among others, has ar-
gued that allowing a menu of options as to the
form a legal partnership takes is one step in a
sedimentary progression towards allowing
same-sex marriage. 143 His focus is primarily on
the social aspect of the progression, seeing legi-
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timization of same-sex marriage as the ultimate
action in a path that moved through decriminal-
ization of sodomy and prohibiting discrimina-
tion against homosexuals.
144
Allowing domestic partnership as one
choice among a spectrum of possible models -
from partners living together but not entering
into any formal arrangement to covenant mar-
riages that cannot be terminated with no-fault
divorce - advances the eventual goal of same-
sex marriage as it normalizes untraditional rela-
tionships. If the path towards same-sex mar-
riage is conceptualized as a series of small victo-
ries for the gay rights movement, starting with
the decriminalization of sodomy, acceptance of
domestic partnerships is thus one more incre-
mental advance rather than a distraction from
the ultimate goal.
B. How the Argument Changes by Focusing
on Domestic Partnerships
The arguments for extending rights such as
marriage to homosexuals are generally
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment. An
asserted right can be found in either the Due
Process Clause, arguing that a given right is fun-
damental and cannot be infringed without trig-
gering strict scrutiny by the courts, or the Equal
Protection Clause, claiming that homosexuals
are being denied equal protection of the law.
Each of these techniques has significant weak-
nesses, particularly in the context of the issue of
marriage.
1. Due Process
One argument rooted in the Fourteenth
Amendment turns on understanding marriage
to be a fundamental right. If a state law affects
a fundamental right, it is subject to more
searching scrutiny than a challenge to a more
innocuous regulation. The question in the con-
text of same-sex marriage thus becomes
whether marriage is fundamental.
136. See generally Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (discussing con-
tract rights of unmarried partners).
137. Bix, supra note 105, at 167.
138. Id.
139. Brinig, Status, supra note 108, at 1596, 1598.
140. See id. at 1596 (noting that the "concept of covenant
always misplaces a contract or law and economics analysis").
141. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-801 (2006); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 25-901 (2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272
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It would seem that this would be a rela-
tively easy answer: the courts have found in pre-
vious cases reviewed supra that the right to
marry is indeed a fundamental right. Yet ques-
tions of what rights are fundamental often be-
come problems of definition: how a given judge
or attorney characterizes the right at stake vir-
tually decides whether it is fundamental or not.
Same-sex marriage is not framed by its oppo-
nents as dealing with the right to marry. It is
described as the right to marry someone of the
same gender.
A similar problem was also seen in the ex-
ample of the sexual conduct between two per-
sons of the same gender. The shift in rights def-
inition from Bowers v. Hardwick to Lawrence v.
Texas, two Supreme Court cases upholding and
then striking down state bans of sodomy,
demonstrate the importance of how a right is
characterized and how fluid that characteriza-
tion can be. In Bowers, the 1986 case that up-
held a law making sodomy a criminal offense,
the right at issue was defined extremely nar-
rowly and was specifically attendant to homo-
sexuality.145 Justice White's opinion for the
Court described the case as turning upon
"whether the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage
in sodomy.', 14 6 In contrast, Lawrence, the 2003
case that overturned Bowers, the issue was
redrawn as "whether the petitioners were free
as adults to engage in the private conduct in the
exercise of their liberty under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .... ,147
Whether a due process-based argument for
same-sex marriage is found to be persuasive,
therefore, tends to turn on whether one con-
ceives of the argument as a fundamental right
to marriage in the abstract or a fundamental
right for homosexuals to engage in marriage to
a person of their same gender. This is particu-
larly effective with regard to marriage, as one of
145. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
146. Id. at 190.
147. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
148. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press
Secretary, President Calls for Constitutional Amendment
Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html.
This press release stated:
[t]he union of a man and woman is the most enduring
human institution, honoring - honored and encouraged
in all cultures and by every religious faith .... Today I
call upon the Congress to promptly pass, and to send to
the most common arguments advanced by those
opposed to gay marriage is that marriage itself
is intrinsically a union between one man and
one woman. 148 The battle over gay marriage
therefore becomes a battle over the definition
of marriage, and the history of marriage as a
heterosexual institution is thus a significant ob-
stacle to reform.
2. Equal Protection
The other possible argument from the
Fourteenth Amendment rises out of the Equal
Protection Clause, claiming that preventing gay
couples from marrying denies them equal pro-
tection of the laws. The largest problem with
this strategy is that because homosexuals are
not recognized as a discrete and insular minor-
ity with the characteristics justifying characteri-
zation as a suspect class, a charge that a law
does not treat homosexuals equally is subject
only to rational basis review, the least rigorous
standard of constitutional scrutiny.
149
There are two ways to deal with the lower
scrutiny. One is to recast the issue as involving
differential treatment under the law of a group
that does trigger more rigorous scrutiny. One
novel and influential argument utilizing this
technique draws analogy from the interracial
marriage debate: just as the Supreme Court rec-
ognized in Loving that prohibitions of interra-
cial marriage were racial classifications despite
applying to all races equally, the argument runs
that courts should recognize that prohibiting
people of the same gender from marrying each
other is a classification based on sex, and thus
deserving of intermediate judicial scrutiny. 5 °
3. Why Contractual Arguments Revitalize
Rational Basis Review
Occasionally, however, rational basis re-
view has resulted in the striking down of a law
the states for ratification, an amendment to our Consti-
tution defining and protecting marriage as a union of
man and woman as husband and wife.
149. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (discussing when to
apply heightened scrutiny). The handful of successful court
battles to allow same-sex marriage have relied upon equality-
based arguments grounded in state constitutions. See, e.g.,
Baehr, 852 P.2d 44; Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
150. See, e.g., Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy,
supra note 6.
that disadvantages homosexuals as a class. The
most well known example is Romer v. Evans.5 '
In Romer, the United States Supreme Court
struck down Amendment II, a Colorado state
constitutional amendment prohibiting munici-
pal or state anti-discrimination statutes prohib-
iting discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation on equal protection grounds.1 52 Despite
reaffirming that homosexuals are not a discrete
and insular minority that triggers heightened
constitutional scrutiny under a suspect classifi-
cation analysis, the Court held that "a law de-
claring that in general it shall be more difficult
for one group of citizens than for all others to
seek aid from the government is itself a denial
of equal protection of the laws in the most lit-
eral sense.''153 Furthermore, the amendment
failed rational basis review because it "seem[ed]
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
class it affect[ed].'
' 54
Some advocates of same-sex marriage have
theorized that a rational basis review of laws
prohibiting same-sex marriage could find that
such laws violate the Equal Protection Clause,
even under the most deferential examination.
155
In the context of marriage, with all the social
and religious freight that the concept still car-
ries today, this argument is unlikely to be suc-
cessful. A rational basis review of statutes or
state constitutional amendments limiting mar-
riage to one man and one woman under the
Equal Protection Clause will almost certainly
uphold the restriction, since the justification can
be advanced that the government's interest is
not animus toward homosexuals but rather the
protection of a traditional institution long "de-
fined" as existing between a man and a woman.
Such review of a state constitutional
amendment singling out homosexuals as not
able to create domestic partnerships or
reproduce any of the contractual elements of
marriage, however, is similar to Romer's
WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER [Vol. 28:145 2007]
Amendment II in that it is difficult to explain
such prohibitions except on the grounds of ani-
mus towards homosexuals.
156
The key to the similarity to Amendment II
is that most state constitutional amendments go
beyond simply prohibiting same-sex marriage to
also banning any legal recognition of same-sex
relationships. For example, the Arkansas
amendment bans "[1]egal status for unmarried
persons which is identical or substantially simi-
lar to marital status., 15 7 Georgia's amendment
states that "[n]o union between persons of the
same sex shall be recognized by this state as en-
titled to the benefits of marriage.' 158 A ques-
tion on Kentucky's ballot asked the voter
whether he agreed "that a legal status identical
to or similar to marriage for unmarried individ-
uals shall not be valid or recognized." '159 And
Utah's amendment provides that "[nlo other
domestic union, however denominated, may be
recognized as a marriage or given the same or
substantially equivalent legal effect.)
1 60
Such further restrictions have two far-
reaching effects. First, again along the lines of
Amendment II, such state constitutional
amendments take away the ability of voters to
pass statutes allowing unmarried partners any
legal recognition. 161 In some states, such as
Georgia, the state amendment specifies same-
sex partners only.' 62 In others, any unmarried
partnership is disadvantaged, although some
scholars have suggested that such amendments
can be read narrowly to apply only to same-sex
partners. 63 The class, either of unmarried part-
ners generally or same-sex partners specifically,
is placed at a particular disadvantage, as such
partners cannot be given legal rights with re-
spect to each other through statute. 64
Second, many of the state amendments
would prohibit even private contracts and
agreements granting same-sex partners legal
rights.' 65 Some of these contracts are private,
151. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 633.
154. Id. at 632.
155. See, e.g., MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 24 (1997).
156. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
157. ARK. CONST. of 1874, amend. 83, § 2.
158. GA. CONST. art. I, § IV (para. 1(b)).
159. Ky. CONST. § 233(a) (notes).
160. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29, cl. 2.
161. See generally ARK. CONST. of 1874, amend. 83; GA.
CONST. art. I, § IV; Ky. CONST. § 233.
162. GA. CONST. art. I, § IV (para. 1(a)).
163. See Sean Perry, When Marriage is Not Enough: Utah's
Marriage Amendment in Context, 7 J. L. FAM. STUD. 275, 279
(2005).
164. Id. at 279-80.
165. See Ky. CONST. § 233(a); Legal Documents and Pro-
tections for Lesbians and Gay Men, LIFE PLANNING PUBL'N
(Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, New York,
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individualized agreements between the partners
intended to reproduce some of the rights of
marriage.' 66 Gay rights organizations publish
guides to legal planning that detail how to es-
tablish as many of the marriage rights as possi-
ble.' 67 Other such recognitions are benefits ex-
tended by employers to same-sex partners,
including benefits such as family sick leave, be-
reavement leave, and sometimes even life or
health insurance.' 68 Extending health or life in-
surance to same-sex partners is particularly vul-
nerable to conflict with amendments banning
legal recognition of same-sex partners that is
similar to married partners, because such part-
ners generally must establish their domestic
partnership in some official way in order to
qualify for the insurance.169 Finally, extensions
of rights or programs to same-sex partners, such
as granting a restraining order against a violent
same-sex partner, may be curtailed. 7 '
Such extreme restrictions raise the same
constitutional problems as Amendment II.
Taking away the ability of same-sex partners to
pass statutes or policies respecting any legal
rights to one another, places same-sex partners
at a particular disadvantage, based solely upon
their status as homosexuals. As the Court
stated in Romer, laws "singling out a certain
class of citizens for disfavored legal status or
general hardships are rare," and is a literal "de-
nial of equal protection of the laws." 17'
A recent New Jersey case serves as one ex-
ample of how this argument may look in prac-
tice. In Lewis v. Harris, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court dealt with a same-sex marriage
case holding that
[a]t this point, we do not consider
whether committed same-sex couples
should be allowed to marry, but only
whether those couples are entitled to
the same rights and benefits afforded
to married heterosexual couples. Cast
in that light, the issue is not about the
transformation of the traditional defi-
nition of marriage, but about the une-
qual dispensation of benefits and privi-
leges to one of two similarly situated
classes of people.'72
Evaluating the equality claim, the court then
held that the extant New Jersey marriage stat-
utes that denied the right to marry to same-sex
couples violated the New Jersey State Constitu-
tion.17 3
It is difficult to imagine a justification that
does not rest upon animus towards homosexu-
als for such amendments that even prohibit em-
ployers from voluntarily giving their own em-
ployees bereavement if a same-sex partner
passes away. In Romer, Amendment II was
struck down by the Court as "a status-based en-
actment divorced from any factual context from
which we could discern a relationship to legiti-
mate state interests; it is a classification of per-
sons undertaken for its own sake, something the
Equal Protection Clause does not permit.
174
State constitutional amendments banning do-
mestic partnerships or any extension of legal
rights to same-sex partners are strikingly similar




Reviving the contractual argument signifi-
cantly changes the framing of the debate con-
cerning same-sex marriage, and offers different
assessments of possible success. The fight for
same-sex marriage can be roughly divided into
three fronts. First, there is an affirmative battle
working to achieve formal recognition of same-
sex marriage under law, requiring an amended
N.Y.), 1998, at 2-3 [hereinafter Legal Documents, LIFE PLAN-
NING PUBL'N].
166. See Legal Documents, LIFE PLANNING PUBL'N, supra
note 165, at 6-8; Ga. CONST. art. I, § IV (para. 1(b)).
167. E.g., Legal Documents, LIFE PLANNING PUBL'N,
supra note 165.
168. See id. at 2-3.
169. A Guide for LGBT Employees, OUT AT WORK 33
(Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, New York, N.Y.
2004), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/take-action/
tool-kits/out-at-work/. Such requirements are meant to guar-
antee insurance providers that claims of insurance benefits
will be limited to long-term, stable partnerships that are quite
literally substantially equivalent to marriage. Id. For exam-
pie, Lambda Legal's guide to advocating extending insurance
benefits to same-sex partners at work directly promotes "[a]
domestic partnership affidavit" as a means of assuring insur-
ance companies that they will not be defrauded. Id.
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Same-Sex Relationships: Constitutional Implications of Ne-
braska's Initiative 416, 11 J.L. & POL'Y 1, 26 (2003).
171. Rorner, 517 U.S. at 633.
172. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 217 (N.J. 2006).
173. Id. at 220.
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175. See generally ARK. CONST. of 1874, amend. 83; GA.
CONST. art. I, § IV; Ky. CONST. § 233.
legal and cultural understanding of what mar-
riage is. Second, there is an affirmative move-
ment to create marriage-like relationships for
unmarried partners through institutions such as
domestic partnerships or civil unions. Finally,
there is a defensive struggle either to prevent
passage of legislation banning same-sex mar-
riage, currently primarily fought in the context
of state constitutional amendments, or to chal-
lenge extant bans in the courts.
A contractual argument for same-sex rela-
tionships will almost certainly have no success
in arguing for the ability to marry outright.
Marriage itself has been sufficiently recognized
as a fundamental right that even with the in-
creased acknowledgement of the contractual el-
ements, a right to marry based solely in the
right to contract on equal terms is unlikely. The
viability of a contractual argument on the sec-
ond and third fronts, however, is significantly
better. As delineated above, an argument for
domestic partnerships as contracts makes the
challenge to bans of same-sex partnerships
much more powerful even under rational basis
review.
A contract-based argument against
prohibitions of same-sex marriage that also en-
compasses domestic partnerships changes the
framing of the debate in a way that accrues ma-
terial advantages and disadvantages. The con-
tractual argument focusing on domestic part-
nerships rather than marriage per se does not
address the most contentious elements of the
marriage discussion head-on. Same-sex mar-
riage is an issue of importance for advocates of
homosexual rights, that is, because it is so
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freighted with questions of status and societal
acceptance. The very characteristics that sug-
gest the viability of a contract-based argument
for domestic partnerships, therefore, are for
many the reason why same-sex marriage is im-
portant: more than the practical benefits of do-
mestic partnerships, the status as recognized by
society, condoned, and celebrated partnerships
is the true significance of same-sex marriage.
Therefore, to the extent that such acceptance is
the goal of working towards same-sex marriage,
the contract-based approach I have laid out is
inadequate.
There is a strong argument, however, that a
sedimentary progression towards marriage will
be more successful than fighting the highly con-
tentious battle for marriage outright. In this
sense, therefore, a less controversial argument
that is not dependent on arguments explicitly
advancing the equal rights of homosexuals to
enter into as significant an institution as mar-
riage nevertheless moves American society one
step closer towards acceptance of same-sex
marriage and equal rights in general.
The contract-based argument for domestic
partnerships, therefore, does not present a solu-
tion to the question of how to secure the legal
right for same-sex partners to marry. It does,
however, offer a persuasive justification for tak-
ing one step further along a road that might one
day lead to same-sex marriage - and for the
time being, will result in a powerful weapon
against particularly exclusionary same-sex mar-
riage prohibitions and work towards greater
equality in the form of privately formed legal
relationships and domestic partnerships.
